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Recently, a growing number of studies have investigated the cues used by children to
selectively accept testimony. In parallel, several studies with adults have shown that the
ﬂuency with which information is provided inﬂuences message evaluation: adults evaluate
ﬂuent information as more credible than dysﬂuent information. It is therefore plausible that
the ﬂuency of a message could also inﬂuence children’s endorsement of statements.Three
experimentswere designed to test this hypothesiswith 3- to 5-year-oldswhere the auditory
ﬂuency of a message was manipulated by adding different levels of noise to recorded
statements. The results show that 4 and 5-year-old children, but not 3-year-olds, are more
likely to endorse a ﬂuent statement than a dysﬂuent one. The present study constitutes a
ﬁrst attempt to show that ﬂuency, i.e., ease of processing, is recruited as a cue to guide
epistemic decision in children. An interpretation of the age difference based on the way
cues are processed by younger children is suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently a growing number of studies in developmental psychol-
ogy have underlined the importance of testimony in knowledge
acquisition (e.g., Clément, 2010; Harris, 2012). Given the risk of
being misguided by manipulative or misinformed sources (Sper-
ber et al., 2010), one of the objectives of this line of research is
to determine whether children are able to assess the compara-
tive credibility of information provided by a speaker. A typical
paradigm for testing endorsement of statements or of object labels
involves contrasting two sources stating contradictory proposi-
tions and asking children to choose between the two statements
(the conﬂicting sources task). So far, the main focus has been
on properties of the source of the testimony, such as reliabil-
ity (e.g., Koenig and Harris, 2005; Pasquini et al., 2007; Birch
et al., 2008; Scoﬁeld and Behrend, 2008; Corriveau and Har-
ris, 2009a), expertise (Sobel and Corriveau, 2010; Koenig and
Jaswal, 2011) or the emotions displayed by informants (Clément
et al., 2013). Little is known, however, about the inﬂuence of
the message itself on testimony selection. Bernard et al. (2012)
asked whether children would more readily follow an informant
using the connective because to link an argument in a state-
ment than an informant giving very similar information without
the connective. They showed that while 4- and 5-year-olds used
the connective because to guide their selective trust, 3-year-olds
demonstrated indiscriminate selective trust. The same authors
have recently shown that 3-year-olds could take into account
certain informational properties of a message in selecting testi-
monies (Mercier et al., 2014). In fact, 3- to 5-year-olds preferred to
endorse statements including a non-circular argument over a cir-
cular one (see also Corriveau and Kurkul, 2014, and for older
children: Baum et al., 2008). The three experiments reported
in this paper explore a cue embedded in the message that has
not been yet investigated: the ﬂuency of the communicated
information.
Processing ﬂuency can be deﬁned as “the ease or difﬁculty with
which new, external information can be processed” (Schwarz,
2004, p. 338). Fluency, or ease of processing, is what a per-
son may experience when attempting to perceptually discriminate
objects with a given property (perceptual ﬂuency), retrieve items
from episodic or semantic memory (retrieval ﬂuency), or under-
stand the communicated content (conceptual ﬂuency; see Alter
and Oppenheimer, 2009). Dysﬂuent information is information
that is more difﬁcult to process, requiring, for instance, a longer
latency before any decision can be reached by adults (see Koch and
Forgas, 2012). Several studies on adults support the prediction
that ﬂuent statements are more readily endorsed than dysﬂuent
ones: ﬂuent stimuli subjectively appear to be more credible, and
are more frequently judged as probably true on a Likert scale than
dysﬂuent ones (for ameta-analysis of this effect, see Dechêne et al.,
2010). Regarding this effect, ﬂuency has been, for instance,manip-
ulated through repeated exposure to statements, which enhances
the ease of processing (Johnston et al., 1985). A number of studies
have shown that repeated statements were judged as more cred-
ible in comparison to statements that had not been presented
before (e.g., Hasher et al., 1977; Begg et al., 1992; Brown and Nix,
1996). The effect of repeated exposure on credibility judgment
could be explained as follows: processing a repeated statement is
experienced as unexpectedly ﬂuent. This unexpected ﬂuency is
experienced as discrepant from a comparison standard. Research
has shown that an experienced discrepancy between expected and
actual ﬂuency of a stimulus generates feelings of familiarity (e.g.,
Whittlesea et al., 1990; Whittlesea andWilliams, 1998, 2000; Whit-
tlesea, 2004). These feelings involve the sense that something has
been encountered before. They are generated by the higher ﬂuency
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which previous exposure confers to perceptual and memorial
processing of a given item. It has been hypothesized that these
feelings of familiarity in turn affect credibility judgments because
experiencing a stimulus as familiar could lead subjects to feel that
they have seen or heard this stimulus before, suggesting that it is
probably more credible (e.g., Reber and Schwarz, 1999; Weaver
et al., 2007; Schwarz, 2010).
Arguably, any other variable that increases processing ﬂuency
might have the same epistemic effect as prior exposure, and in
fact people make similar credibility judgments about statements
that are ﬂuently processed for other reasons than repetitive pre-
sentation. Studies have demonstrated that other instantiations of
ﬂuency, such as rhyme in aphorisms (McGlone and Toﬁghbakhsh,
2000) or high contrast in the visual presentation of statements
(Reber and Schwarz, 1999; Koch and Forgas, 2012), also inﬂuence
credibility judgments. For example, Reber and Schwarz (1999)
manipulated the visual ﬂuency of statements: various color fonts
were used on a computer screen to make the statements more or
less difﬁcult to read against a white background. After each pre-
sentation, adult participants were asked if the statement presented
(e.g., “Osorno is in Chile”) was true or false. The statements were
more likely to be judged as true when presented in a highly visible
color, i.e., in a ﬂuent presentation.
The three experiments reported in this paper manipulated the
auditory ﬂuency of the message by adding different levels of noise
to statements presented to children. Even though the effect of ﬂu-
ency on credibility with this type of auditorymanipulation has not
been previously tested in adults, research on memory has shown
that this kind of manipulation generates different levels of ﬂu-
ency. For instance, in a study by Goldinger et al. (1999), adults
were brieﬂy presented with lists of words and the auditory ﬂu-
ency was manipulated by presenting the words with soft or loud
background noise. Adults were then presented with a recogni-
tion test (recognition judgments). Results indicated that adults
were more likely to consider a word as “old” (sense of familiar-
ity) when it was presented with the soft background noise (ﬂuent
presentation) thanwith the loud background noise (dysﬂuent pre-
sentation; for other operationalizations of auditory ﬂuency see
Rhodes and Castel, 2009; Besken and Mulligan, 2013). From a
more general perspective, it has been shown that ﬂuency inﬂu-
ences memory assessment. In particular, it has been established
that a wide range of perceptual ﬂuency affects judgments of
learning (i.e., people’s estimations of how well they have learned
something) and recognition judgments (e.g., Kelley and Rhodes,
2002; Kornell et al., 2011; McDonough and Gallo, 2012; Yue et al.,
2013).
Given that adults judge a ﬂuent statement to be more credible
than a dysﬂuent one, one can expect that, in the absence of other
cues, children should be more willing to endorse a statement that
is easier to process. There are no studies directly addressing this
question in the case of preschoolers, and, more generally, nothing
is known about the possible inﬂuence of ﬂuency on child devel-
opment. If two conﬂicting statements, one ﬂuent and the other
dysﬂuent, are presented by two different informants (as in the
classical paradigm used in research on testimony with children),
children should selectively endorse themore ﬂuent statement. This
selectivity would be based only on the fact that higher ﬂuency
makes a statement more credible, as in adult studies. In the three
experiments described below, the possible role of the auditory ﬂu-
ency of a message on endorsement of statements was investigated.
Participants were as young as 3-years-old, an age at which it has
been demonstrated that children are able to take part in the con-
ﬂicting sources task (Koenig et al., 2004), and as old as 5, to see if
there were any developmental differences. These possible develop-
mental differences are investigated given that previous studies have
reported developmental changes in testimony selection between 3-
and 5-year-olds when the message itself was manipulated and not
the properties of the informants (Bernard et al., 2012; Corriveau
and Kurkul, 2014; Mercier et al., 2014).
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
This experiment involved 81 children: 27 3-year-olds (11 girls,
Mage = 42.66 months, SD = 3.80, range 36–47 months), 26
4-year-olds (11 girls, Mage = 52.88 months, SD = 3.69, range 48–
59 months), and 28 5-year-olds (15 girls, Mage = 67.03 months,
SD = 3.52, range 61–71 months) from a school in Lyon (France).
All the participants were French, and all the experiments were
conducted in French. Most childrenwere frommiddle- andupper-
middle-class families. Each child was tested individually in a
quiet room by a single experimenter for about 10 min. Informed
parental consent was obtained for each child. All participants were
treated according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials and procedure
To test whether children are more likely to endorse a ﬂuent than
a dysﬂuent statement, a conﬂicting sources task was used. Three
stories were presented to children on a computer screen. All sto-
ries were constructed on the same model: in the ﬁrst vignette, a
young Playmobil girl arrived at a place where two closed colored
boxes are sitting on a table (places counterbalanced). This girl was
carrying an object, and the experimenter explained that the girl
was going to put this object in one of the two boxes. A second
vignette showed the same girl without the object. The experi-
menter explained that she was leaving after having put the object
in one of the boxes; he speciﬁed that he did not know which of the
two boxes contained the object. Then, the experimenter showed
a third vignette where two new female Playmobil characters were
depicted (Figure 1).
The experimenter gave the names of the two characters and said
that each one of them would help him ﬁnd the object. Children
wore headphones in order to listen to what the characters said.
For the ﬁrst character, an animation bubble popped up and a
voice recording was activated; the child heard, for instance, “The
ball is in the orange box.” The same procedure was repeated with
the second character, who stated, for instance, “The ball is in the
pink box”(the characters’ locations, the order of bubble activation,
the ﬂuency of each sentence and the voice attributed to a character
were all counterbalanced).
Finally, the experimenter asked the children,“According to you,
where is theball?” If the childrendidnot respond, the experimenter
asked: “Is the ball here (pointing at one of the boxes) or is the ball
here (pointing at the other)?”
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FIGURE 1 |Vignettes for the ball story.
The two other stories were built on the same model. In each of
them, the young girl, the object carried, the colors of the boxes and
their places (right/left), the two female informants, their names
and the voices associated with them were varied. The child could
obtain a maximum score of 3 points (1 point for each story when
the box linked to the more ﬂuent statement was chosen).
After the three stories, children listened to each statement again
to evaluate their comprehension—this was done by asking them to
repeat each statement. This step was used to ensure that children’s
choices were not linked to any difﬁculty of comprehension. All
children succeeded at this comprehension test.
All sentences were recorded and modiﬁed using Audacity
software. The sentences were digitized (32-bit resolution) at a
44.1-kHz sampling rate. For each story (N = 3), two different
volunteers were asked to say the two sentences corresponding to
the two locations in a neutral tone.
The sentences were normalized to produce an output level of
80 dB-A (A-weighted decibels: audible decibels measured with an
artiﬁcial ear) and standardized to 2.1 s in duration. Two sepa-
rate copies were created for each sentence and modiﬁed by adding
Brownian noise to obtain two levels of auditory ﬂuency: a ﬂu-
ent statement (amplitude of Brownian noise = 50 dB-A) and a
dysﬂuent statement (amplitude of Brownian noise = 65 dB-A).
Brownian noise (or red noise) is the kind of signal noise produced
by Brownian motion (random process). The sound is a low roar
resembling a waterfall and has a “soft” quality compared to white
and pink noise.
To test whether these two levels of ﬂuency were percep-
tually discriminated, 23 adults were recruited (13 women,
Mage = 23.88 years, SD = 5.5 years, age range 19–44 years). The
adults listened to the stimuli and rated the recording quality for
each sentence on a scale from 1 (very good quality) to 7 (very bad
quality). The results showed that the ﬂuent statements (M = 2.39,
SD = 0.89) were evaluated as having better auditory quality than
the dysﬂuent statements [M = 5.26, SD = 1.17, t(44) = 9.32,
p < 0.001].
RESULTS
The percentage of choices elicited by ﬂuent sentences was 44.4%
for the 3-year-olds, 58.9% for the 4-year-olds, and 65.5% for the
5-year-olds (Figure 2). A 3 (age group: 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds,
5-year-olds) × 2 (gender: girl, boy) analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with the score of ﬂuent choices as a dependent variable yielded a
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of fluent choices in each Experiment and in
each age group (the chance line is at 0.50). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
one-sample t -test.
signiﬁcantmain effect only for the age group factor,F(2,75)=4.75,
p< 0.05. The 5-year-olds chose the ﬂuent statements signiﬁcantly
more1 (M = 1.96, SD = 0.84) than the 3-year-olds (M = 1.33,
SD = 0.78). 4-year-olds’ performance (M = 1.77, SD = 0.65) was
not signiﬁcantly different from that of the 3-year-olds or from that
of the 5-year-olds.
However, children’s choices elicitedbyﬂuent sentenceswere sig-
niﬁcantly above chance for the 4-year-olds, t(25) = 2.11, p = 0.04,
and 5-year-olds, t(27)= 2.93, p = 0.01, but not for the 3-year-olds,
t(26) = −1.10, p = 0.28. These ﬁndings could be explained by the
fact that the ANOVA did not take the chance level into account or
1All comparisons were calculated according to the Bonferroni procedure.
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test hierarchical relations between means (in this case, theANOVA
tested the null hypothesis M1 = M2 = M3). Following the differ-
ence between the groups in terms of chance and the percentages
of choices elicited by ﬂuent sentences, another hypothesis can be
tested: the 3-year-olds choose the ﬂuent statements less often than
the 4-year-olds; and the performance of the 4-year-olds is similar
to that of the 5-year-olds. To test this hypothesis more speciﬁcally,
a contrast analysis was used (see e.g.,Wendorf, 2004). This kind of
analysis is more powerful for testing speciﬁc hierarchical hypothe-
ses than classical analyses, and can be used even if the classical
test is not signiﬁcant (Brauer and McClelland, 2005). Two con-
trasts were tested in a regression analysis: a contrast of interest2,
corresponding to the previous hypothesis regarding the age dif-
ference, and an orthogonal contrast, which tested the residual
variance. The hypothesis can be accepted if the contrast of interest
predicts the choices of the ﬂuent statements and if the orthogonal
contrast does not. The contrast analysis conﬁrmed this hypoth-
esis: F(1,78) = 2.96, p = 0.004, for the contrast of interest, and
F(1,78) = 0.94, p = 0.35, for the orthogonal contrast.
DISCUSSION
This ﬁrst experiment showed that 4- and 5-year-olds use auditory
ﬂuency to select which testimony to endorse. These results are the
ﬁrst to indicate that ﬂuency could play a role in testimony selection
by children and, from a wider perspective, could play an epistemic
role in child development.
The fact that sensitivity to ﬂuency is only elicited in 4- and 5-
year-olds demands an explanation. First, it could be hypothesized
that 3-year-olds do not discriminate between ﬂuent and dysﬂu-
ent sentences. In fact, anatomical data has shown that children do
not reach the adult level of myelination for the auditory system
until around age 4–5 (Kinney et al., 1988; Moore and Linthicum,
2007). Thus it is likely that 3-year-olds cannot use auditory ﬂu-
ency because their perceptual system does not provide sufﬁciently
contrasted information about the quality of the signals. Given
that Experiment 1 tested only how discrepancy in ﬂuency was per-
ceived by adults, we decided to include in a second experiment a
measure to evaluate if the two levels of ﬂuency manipulated were
perceptually discriminated by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children.
The difference between the 3-year-olds’ results and those of
older children could also be explained in another way: one could
consider that children needed to reason about the knowledge of
others in order to succeed in the conﬂicting sources task of Experi-
ment 1. If this is the case, one should expect that this task required
social cognitive abilities such as a theory of mind. Indeed, given
that the ability to pass false belief tasks develops between 3 and
4 years of age (Wellman et al., 2001), it is plausible that the dif-
ference between 3-year-olds and older children was related to a
difference in theory of mind development, even if the relation
between theory of mind and testimony selection is a matter of
debate (e.g., Proust, 2012; Lucas et al., 2013). In order to test
this hypothesis, children were therefore presented with three false
belief tasks in Experiment 2.
2The contrast of interest was −2, 1, 1: the 3-year-olds’ performance (coded −2)
is lower than that of the 4-year-olds (coded 1), which is similar to that of the
5-year-olds (coded 1). The orthogonal contrast was 0, −1, 1.
Finally, regarding the results of the older children, one could
argue that the discrepancy in ﬂuencymay lead children to attribute
characteristics such as familiarity or in-group membership to the
informant who used the ﬂuent statement. In fact, recent studies
have shown that familiarity and group membership inﬂuence tes-
timony selection in young children (e.g., Corriveau and Harris,
2009b; MacDonald et al., 2013). In order to ensure that chil-
dren’s choices were not linked to a preference for the informant
whose message was more ﬂuent, a preference question was also
introduced in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
Participants
This experiment involved 78 children: 24 3-year-olds (9
girls, Mage = 42.83 months, SD = 3.69, range 37–47
months), 27 4-year-olds (12 girls, Mage = 53.33 months,
SD = 4.06, range 48–59 months), and 27 5-year-olds (17 girls,
Mage = 67.29 months, SD = 3.41, range 62–71 months) from
two schools in Lyon (France). The measure of children’s audi-
tory evaluation of the two levels of ﬂuency involved 66 children:
22 3-year-olds (11 girls, Mage = 41.5 months, SD = 3.76, range
36–47 months), 23 4-year-olds (17 girls, Mage = 54.39 months,
SD = 3.31, range 49–58 months), and 21 5-year-olds (9 girls,
Mage = 65.33 months, SD = 3.77, range 60–71 months) from a
school in Lyon. The demographics were similar to those of Exper-
iment 1. Each child was tested individually in a quiet room by a
single experimenter for about 10 min. Informed parental consent
was obtained for each child. All participantswere treated according
to the Declaration of Helsinki.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
Conﬂicting sources task
In the ﬁrst vignette, a young Playmobil girl, Pauline, and her dog,
were presented to the children on a computer screen. The experi-
menter explained that Pauline’s dog often escapes and Pauline has
to look for him. Then the experimenter said: “In this game, you
will try to help Pauline ﬁnd her dog.”
A second vignette showed Pauline facing two Playmobil female
characters. Each one pointed in a different direction. The exper-
imenter said: “One day, Pauline is looking for her dog in a park.
These two ladies tell her something.We are going to listen to them.”
Using the same headphones as in Experiment 1, the child heard the
ﬁrst character say: “The dog went over there.”The same procedure
was repeatedwith the second character. This second character used
the exact same sentence (“The dogwent over there”) but pointed in
a different direction (the characters’ locations, the order of bubble
activation, the ﬂuency of each sentence and the voice attribution
for the character were again counterbalanced). The ﬂuency of the
messages was manipulated in the same way as in Experiment 1.
Finally, the experimenter asked the children, “According to you,
where did Pauline’s dog go?”
For each of the three following trials, two new characters
pointed to a different location and stated: “The dog went over
there.” The background of each picture, the female characters and
their voices were varied. The child could obtain a maximum score
of 4 points (1 point for each story when the direction provided
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with the more ﬂuent sentence was chosen — children indicated
their choices by pointing to one of the two directions, that is to
one side of the screen).
After the four stories, children listened to each statement again
to allow evaluation of (1) their comprehension — by asking them
to repeat each statement; and (2) their preference for each infor-
mant — by asking them after these two statement repetitions
following each story: “Do you prefer this lady (pointing) or this
lady (pointing)?”The ﬁrst step was undertaken to ensure that chil-
dren’s choices were not linked to any difﬁculty of comprehension.
As in Experiment 1, all children succeeded at this comprehension
test. The second question was asked in order to ensure that chil-
dren’s choices were not linked to a preference for the informant
whose message was more ﬂuent. Each child could obtain a max-
imum score of 4 points related to these preference choices (1
point for each story when the character linked to the more ﬂuent
statement was chosen).
The ﬂuent and dysﬂuent statements were created in the same
way as in Experiment 1. Since there were four stories, they were
recorded this time by eight female volunteers. As the sentences
were slightly shorter, they were standardized to a duration of 1.9 s.
False belief tasks
In order to evaluate theory of mind abilities, children were pre-
sentedwith three false belief tasks. The ﬁrst taskwas an unexpected
transfer task adapted from Wimmer and Perner (1983). In this
task, a story character put an object in one place and then left.
Another character moved the object, putting it in another place
and then the ﬁrst character came back. The child was asked a test
question (a belief question): “Where will (story character) look
for her (object)?” Two control questions were asked to check that
the child remembered both the original place and the actual one.
These control questions had to be answered correctly so that credit
could be given for the test questions. The test question was allotted
a binary score (1/0).
The second task was an unexpected content task adapted from
Perner et al. (1987). In this task, the child had to identify the
content of a familiar box. After having answered correctly, the
child could open the box and see the unexpected content inside.
Then the box was closed and the child was asked the following
test questions: a “self” belief question, “Before opening the box,
what did you think was inside?,” and an “other” belief question
about a friend who had not looked inside, “(name of the friend)
has not looked inside the box. What will he/she think is inside
the box before opening it?” One control question was asked to
check whether the child remembered the actual content of the
box. As in the ﬁrst task, this control question had to be answered
correctly before credit could be given for the test questions. The
test questions were allotted a binary score (1/0).
The third task was another unexpected one, adapted from Jenk-
ins andAstington (1996). In this task, the childwas shownapicture
book in which a partial view of what seemed to be a rabbit’s tail
was in fact a lady’s hairstyle bun (unexpected picture). The child
was asked the following test questions: a “self” belief question,
“Before I turned the page, what did you think this was?” and an
“other” belief question about a friend, “(name of the friend) has
not seen this image. Before I turn the page, what will he/she think
FIGURE 3 | Excerpt of screen presentation for the auditory evaluation
task (left) and for the reaction time task (right).
it is?” The test questions were allotted a binary score (1/0). For
these three tasks, the child could therefore obtain a maximum raw
score of 5.
Auditory evaluation task
To test if the two levels of ﬂuency were perceptually discrimi-
nated by children of each age group, another group of children
were asked to evaluate the recording quality of the sentences used
in the conﬂicting sources task of Experiment 2. The task con-
sisted of a warm-up (six items: three ﬂuent, three dysﬂuent) and
then the task per se (eight items: four ﬂuent, four dysﬂuent). For
each item, children were shown a picture of two yellow smiley
faces (Figure 3). The experimenter said to the children: “You
are going to hear some girls. These girls are going to say some-
thing. They will always say the same thing but sometimes you
will hear quite clearly what they say and sometimes you will
not hear very clearly what they say. If you hear quite clearly
what they say, you have to press this button (the experimenter
pointed to the button on the keyboard with the corresponding
smiley). If you don’t hear very clearly what they say, you have to
press this button (the experimenter pointed to the button on the
keyboard with the corresponding smiley).” Using the same head-
phones as in the conﬂicting sources task, children then heard a
sentence (i.e., “ The dog went over there”) and the experimenter
asked: “Did you hear quite clearly what the girl said (the exper-
imenter pointed to the corresponding button) or did you not
hear very clearly what the girl said (the experimenter pointed
to the corresponding button; order counterbalanced)?” These
instances of instruction and feed-back were only used during the
warm-up. The task was created using the software program E-
prime to randomly present the sentences and to record which
button was pressed by the child. For each item, 1 point was
attributed to children when they pressed the button “heard quite
clearly” and 0 when they pressed the button “not heard very
clearly.”
RESULTS
Conﬂicting sources task
The percentage of choices associated with ﬂuent sentences was
48.9% for the 3-year-olds, 62.9% for the 4-year-olds, and 62.1%
for the 5-year-olds (Figure 2). An ANOVA failed to reveal any sig-
niﬁcant main effects or interaction effects between age group and
gender factors. However, as in Experiment 1, children’s choices
elicited by ﬂuent sentences were signiﬁcantly above chance for the
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1412 | 5
Bernard et al. The medium helps the message
4-year-olds, t(26) = 2.33, p = 0.03, and 5-year-olds, t(26) = 2.47,
p = 0.02, but not for the 3-year-olds, t(23) = −0.24, p = 0.81. Fol-
lowing these differences between the groups in terms of chance and
the percentages of choices elicited by ﬂuent sentences, a contrast
analysis was also conducted to test the samehypothesis as in Exper-
iment 1: the 3-year-olds choose the ﬂuent statements less often
than the 4-year-olds; and the performance of the 4-year-olds is
similar to that of the 5-year-olds. The contrast analysis conﬁrmed
this hypothesis: F(1,75) = 2.16, p = 0.03, for the contrast of
interest, and F(1,75) = −0.133, p = 0.89, for the orthogonal
contrast.
False belief tasks
Regarding the three false belief tasks, nine childrenwere not able to
respond correctly to the control questions: four 3-year-olds, four
4-year-olds and one 5-year-old. They were thus removed from the
following analyses. The percentage of success for all the false belief
tasks was at 34% for the 3-year-olds, 57.4% for the 4-year-olds,
and 83.8% for the 5-year-olds.
These results correspond to the classical trend in the theory of
mind literature for this kind of explicit task (e.g., Wellman et al.,
2001). Given that this false belief evaluation was conducted to test
the relation between ﬂuent choices and theory of mind abilities,
the next step in our analysis presents the correlations between false
belief scores and ﬂuent choices.
Correlations
There were no signiﬁcant correlations between the ﬂuent choices
and the false belief scores, both for all children, r = 0.10, p = 0.41,
and for each age group (3-year-olds: r = −0.21, p = 0.36; 4-year-
olds: r = 0.19, p = 0.37; 5-year-olds: r = −0.08, p = 0.68).
To better understand the relation between the ﬂuent choices
and the theory of mind abilities, the children who succeeded in
the false belief evaluation (i.e., by getting 3 points or more out of
the maximum raw score of 5) and those who did not (i.e., who
got less than 3 points) were distinguished. The performance of
these two groups of children was not signiﬁcantly different for
ﬂuent scores, for all children, t(67) = 0.71, p = 0.48, and for
each age group [3-year-olds: t(18) = −0.31, p = 0.75; 4-year-olds:
t(21) = 0.73, p = 0.47; 5-year-olds: t(24) = −0.85, p = 0.40].
Preference
A 3 (age group: 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds) × 2 (gender:
girl, boy) analysis of variance with the score of preference for the
informant linked to the ﬂuent statement as a dependent variable
yielded no signiﬁcant main effect or interaction effect between
these two factors. For all children, these choices did not signiﬁ-
cantly differ from chance [M = 2.11, SD = 1.06, t(77) = 0.95,
p = 0.34].
Auditory evaluation task
A 3-way ANOVA with age group (3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5-year-
olds) and gender (girl, boy) as between-subjects variables and
ﬂuency level (ﬂuent, dysﬂuent) as within-subjects variable was
performed for the scores in auditory evaluation. This revealed
only a signiﬁcant main effect of ﬂuency level, F(1,60) = 21.46,
p < 0.001. The ﬂuent statements (M = 2.53, SD = 0.96) were
evaluated as having better auditory quality than the dysﬂuent
statements (M = 1.68, SD = 0.93, p < 0.001).
However, 3-year-old children’s evaluation of ﬂuent sentences
(M = 2.40, SD = 1.09) was not signiﬁcantly different from that of
dysﬂuent sentences [M = 1.91, SD = 1.19, t(21) = 1.53, p = 0.14].
Moreover, these two evaluations did not differ signiﬁcantly from
chance [ﬂuent sentences: t(21) = 1.74, p = 0.10; dysﬂuent sen-
tences: t(21) = −0.35, p = 0.72]. In contrast, 4-year-old children’s
evaluation of ﬂuent sentences (M = 2.74, SD = 1.01) was sig-
niﬁcantly different from that of dysﬂuent sentences [M = 1.48,
SD = 0.85, t(22) = 4.57, p < 0.001]. These two evaluations dif-
fered signiﬁcantly from chance [ﬂuent sentences: t(22) = 3.51,
p = 0.002; dysﬂuent sentences: t(22) = −2.96, p = 0.007]. Finally,
5-year-old children’s evaluation of ﬂuent sentences (M = 2.43,
SD = 0.75) was signiﬁcantly different from that of dysﬂuent sen-
tences [M = 1.66, SD = 0.65, t(20) = 2.96, p = 0.008]. These two
evaluations differed signiﬁcantly from chance [ﬂuent sentences:
t(20) = 2.63, p = 0.016; dysﬂuent sentences: t(20) = −2.32,
p = 0.031].
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 replicate and extend those of Experi-
ment 1. The ﬂuencywithwhich amessage is provided inﬂuences 4-
and 5-year-old children’s endorsements of statements. Moreover,
our complementary results enable us to propose an explanation of
the age-group differences.
First, given the results regarding the relation between ﬂuent
choices and false belief scores, it seems that the 3-year-olds’ results
cannot be explained in terms of a theory of mind deﬁcit. A possible
explanation for the 3-year-olds’ failure to use ﬂuencymight be that
they donot yet have a sufﬁciently ﬁne-tuned sensitivity to the audi-
tory quality of messages to discriminate between the two messages
heard. The results of our auditory evaluation task seem to validate
this hypothesis. During this task, only 4- and 5-year-old children
were able to distinguish ﬂuent and dysﬂuent sentences in terms of
their auditory quality. Moreover, the hypothesis that 3-year-olds
donot have a sufﬁciently ﬁne-tuned sensitivity the auditory quality
of messages could be supported by anatomical data (Kinney et al.,
1988; Moore and Linthicum, 2007). In other words, it is likely that
3-year-olds cannot use auditory ﬂuency because their perceptual
system does not provide sufﬁciently contrasted information about
the quality of the signals.
To further investigate this hypothesis, a follow-up experiment
was conducted to evaluate children’s reaction times when respec-
tively facing ﬂuent versus dysﬂuent sentences. Asmentioned in our
introduction, reaction time is a classical index of ﬂuent processing
(e.g., Koch and Forgas, 2012). We hypothesized that 3-year-olds
would have the same latency response for ﬂuent and dysﬂuent
sentences, while 4- and 5-year-olds would respond faster to ﬂuent
than dysﬂuent sentences.
EXPERIMENT 3
METHOD
Participants
This experiment involved 67 children: 22 3-year-olds (11 girls,
Mage = 41.6 months, SD = 3.72, range 36–47 months), 24
4-year-olds (17 girls, Mage = 54.41 months, SD = 3.39, range
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49–59months), and 21 5-year-olds (8 girls,Mage= 65.19months,
SD = 3.66, range 60–71 months) from a school in Lyon (France).
The demographics were similar to those of Experiments 1 and
2. Each child was tested individually in a quiet room by a single
experimenter for about 10 min. Informed parental consent was
obtained for each child. All participants were treated according to
the Declaration of Helsinki.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
To test if our dysﬂuent sentences require longer time latency than
our ﬂuent sentences, and to test if this difference emerges from
4 years onward, the following taskwas used: for each item, children
were shown a screen divided into two parts (black and white)
picturing twodifferent coloredboxes (Figure 3). The experimenter
said to the children: “In this game, we are going to search for some
objects. Each time, only one object will be in one of the two boxes.
Each time, a girl will tell you where the object is. If the girl says
that the object is in the box placed on the black side, you have to
press this button (the experimenter pointed to a black button on
the keyboard). If the girl says that the objects is in the box placed
on the white side, you have to press this button (the experimenter
pointed to a white button on the keyboard). In this game, you
have to answer as quickly as possible.” Children were then invited
to place their index ﬁngers on the two buttons. Using the same
headphones as in Experiments 1 and 2, children then heard for
instance, “The ball is in the orange box,” when viewing a blue and
an orange box (the sentences of Experiment 1 were used for this
experiment). A warm-up (four items: two dysﬂuent, two ﬂuent)
was used to provide feed-back regarding children’s accuracy and
the need to respond as quickly as possible. During this warm-up,
instructions were repeated if needed. The task was created using
the software program E-prime to randomly present the sentences,
to record which button was pressed and the reaction time linked
to each response (measured in ms). Only reaction times linked to
accurate responses were analyzed. After the warm-up, the task per
se involved eight items: four with ﬂuent sentences and four with
dysﬂuent sentences.
RESULTS
Before analyzing reaction time results, the accuracy for each kind
of sentence was examined. The percentage of accuracy for the
ﬂuent sentences was 88.6% for the 3-year-olds, 94.8% for the
4-year-olds, and 90.5% for the 5-year-olds. The percentage of
accuracy for the dysﬂuent sentences was 87.5% for the 3-year-olds,
96.9% for the 4-year-olds, and 94% for the 5-year-olds. There was
no signiﬁcant difference between the accuracy for ﬂuent and dys-
ﬂuent sentences, both for all children, t(66) = −7.53, p = 0.454,
and for each age group [3-year-olds: t(21) = 0.29, p = 0.771; 4-
year-olds: t(23) = −0.81, p = 0.426; 5-year-olds: t(20) = −0.90,
p = 0.379]. This result seems to conﬁrm our previous results
regarding the comprehensionquestions: ourﬂuencymanipulation
did not inﬂuence children’s comprehension.
Regarding the reaction time results, a 3-way ANOVA with Age
Group (3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds) and gender (girl,
boy) as between-subjects variables and ﬂuency level (ﬂuent, dys-
ﬂuent) as within-subjects variable was performed for the mean
reaction time. The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main effect
of age group, F(1,61) = 17.83, p < 0.001, and a signiﬁcant
interaction effect of age group × ﬂuency level, F(2,61) = 3.28,
p = 0.044. Regardless of the ﬂuency level, 3-year-olds took
more time to respond (M = 3112.69 ms, SD = 720.19) than
4-year-olds (M = 2512.70 ms, SD = 360.43) and 5-year-olds
(M = 2300.73 ms, SD = 243.71). Four-year-olds’ performance
was not signiﬁcantly different from that of the 5-year-olds. Tests
of the simple effect of ﬂuency level for each age group showed
that 3-year-old children’s reaction time did not differ between
ﬂuent (M = 3172.20 ms, SD = 776.24) and dysﬂuent sentences
[M = 3053.18 ms, SD = 672.38, F(1,21) = 0.98, p = 0.332].
In contrast, 4-year-olds responded signiﬁcantly faster to ﬂuent
(M = 2422.48 ms, SD = 274.02) than to dysﬂuent sentences
[M = 2602.92 ms, SD = 416.39, F(1,23) = 7.14, p = 0.014].
Five-year-olds also responded signiﬁcantly faster to ﬂuent sen-
tences (M = 2254.69 ms, SD = 225.73) than to dysﬂuent ones
[M = 2346.78 ms, SD = 257.73, F(1,20) = 5.47, p = 0.030].
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the present paper suggest thatmessage ﬂuency inﬂu-
ences 4- and 5-year-old children’s endorsement of statements. As
in the adult studies reviewed above, ﬂuency seems to play an epis-
temic role for children over 4 years old. In the absence of other
information linked to the message or to the two informants, chil-
dren are more likely to accept a ﬂuent statement than a dysﬂuent
one.
Unlike older children, 3-year-olds were not sensitive to the
difference of ﬂuency between the two voices heard. Our comple-
mentary data seem to indicate that the 3-year-olds results could be
explained in terms of auditory immaturity. First, the developmen-
tal trajectory observed in our Experiments 1 and 2 regarding the
use of ﬂuency as an epistemic cue seems not to be linked to theory
of mind development. Indeed, no correlation was found between
theory of mind scores and ﬂuent choices. One could argue that
other developmental changes occurring between 3 and 4 years old
could explainour results. For instance, a developmental changehas
also been observed between 3- and 4-year-olds regarding execu-
tive functions, which were related to theory of mind development
(e.g., Carlson andMoses, 2001). Nevertheless, our results concern-
ing, respectively, the perceived auditory quality and the reaction
time evaluation seem to offer a more economical explanation of
the developmental change observed in the present study. In fact,
3-year-olds did not evaluate differently ﬂuent and dysﬂuent sen-
tences in terms of auditory quality. Moreover, they responded
with the same time latency to ﬂuent and dysﬂuent sentences. In
constrast, 4- and 5-year-old children were able to distinguish ﬂu-
ent and dysﬂuent sentences in terms of auditory quality. They
also responded faster to ﬂuent sentences than to dysﬂuent ones.
Thus, these results, together with anatomical data (Kinney et al.,
1988; Moore and Linthicum,2007), offer evidence that 3-year-olds
cannot use auditory ﬂuency because their perceptual system does
not provide sufﬁciently contrasted information about the signals’
auditory quality. Interestingly, follow-up analyses showed that 3-
year-olds nevertheless used a sort of strategy during the conﬂicting
sources task3. In Experiments 1 and 2, they chose signiﬁcantly
3We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention on this point.
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more often the last sentence provided by one of the two infor-
mants [Experiment 1: 64.2%, t(26) = 2.06, p = 0.049; Experiment
2: 62.5%, t(23) = 2.14, p = 0.043]. Because of the counterbal-
ancing, this response strategy led to null results. In contrast, 4-
and 5-year-olds were at chance regarding the choice of the last
sentence, in Experiment 1 [4-year-olds: 43.6%, t(25) = −0.90,
p = 0.376; 5-year-olds: 57.1%, t(27) = 1.21, p = 0.237] as well
as in Experiment 2 [4-year-olds: 55.5%, t(26) = 1.29, p = 0.207;
5-year-olds: 50.9%, t(26) = 0.25, p = 0.802].
Other results of our study could also shed light on what is at
stake in 4- and 5-year-olds results. The results of the 4- and 5-
year-old children could be interpreted in two ways. According to a
message-based hypothesis, only the characteristic of the message,
here ﬂuency, plays a role in children’s decision. In the literature
dealing with the effect of ﬂuency on credibility judgments in
adults, it was until now the only dimension taken into account,
insofar as the information was not linked to a speciﬁc informant
[for instance in the Reber and Schwarz (1999), adults had to read
sentences on a computer screen]. An informant-based hypothe-
sis, in contrast, supposes that children use ﬂuency to attribute
characteristics to the informants, such as familiarity or linguistic
membership. As mentioned above, recent studies have shown that
familiarity and group membership inﬂuence testimony selection
in young children (e.g., Corriveau and Harris, 2009b; MacDonald
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, our results for the preference questions
do not support the informant-based hypothesis. Children, in each
age group, did not express a preference for the character linked
to the ﬂuent sentences. Of course, further research is necessary
to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms underlying the
answers given by the children in our experiments.
One interesting question remains: is it adaptive for children
to use auditory ﬂuency as a heuristic to endorse a statement, as
they do in our experiment from the age of 4? On the one hand,
as mentioned above, adults use the ﬂuency with which an utter-
ance is processed as a basis for their credibility judgments. It has
been shown, with a modelisation based on Bayes’ theorem, that
ﬂuency is a reliable cue for truth appraisal (Reber and Unkelbach,
2010). Thus, from a general viewpoint, ﬂuency is a valid cue for the
trustworthiness of a message (in the absence of malevolent inten-
tions of potential informants). It is therefore arguable, that, when
two prima facie equally trustworthy informants offer incompati-
ble advice, differential ﬂuency constitutes an indicator of epistemic
reliability.
On the other hand, as mentioned above, processing ﬂuency
can be experimentally manipulated. For instance, misleading
impressions of truth are created by high contrasts in the visual
presentation of a given statement (perceptual ﬂuency), whether
it is true or not (Reber and Schwarz, 1999). In real life, however,
people are often able to use ﬂuency with an understanding of its
actual predictive value, what authors have called the “ecological
validity of ﬂuency” (Herzog and Hertwig, 2013).
Nevertheless, all these studies involved adults and further
research is needed to better understand how and in what cir-
cumstances ﬂuency can play a role in children’s endorsement of
statements. These studies should also involve other instantiations
of ﬂuency. While we have operationalised ﬂuency via an auditory
manipulation, it would be worthwhile to investigate the effects of
ﬂuency through other kinds of operationalisation such as rep-
etition, semantic priming and rhyming [see the McGlone and
Toﬁghbakhsh (2000) study on adults], and to test the effects of
these different kinds of ﬂuency on children’s testimony selection.
In line with the research on adults, we might expect that any
variable that increases processing ﬂuency should have the same
effect on epistemic decision as our auditory manipulation. The
aim of the present study was to test the effect of ﬂuency, as a
generic cue, on preschoolers’ endorsement of statements. Even if,
as we have just mentioned, any instantiations of ﬂuency would be
valid to test its effect, the use of auditory ﬂuency is of particular
interest regarding thematter of how speech processing in noise can
also modulate the endorsement of information. In adults and chil-
dren, a large literature has studied speech perception in noise (e.g.,
Anderson et al., 2010; Song et al., 2012; Strait et al., 2013). More-
over, some studies have tested how a noisy environment inﬂuences
scholastic achievement (Shield and Dockrell, 2003, 2008). Given
that the noise levels in today’s classrooms commonly exceed rec-
ommended levels (e.g., American National Standards Institute,
2002; Bradley and Sato, 2008), our study has ecological validity
and opens up a possible ﬁeld of research concerning the matter of
how noise may inﬂuence, not only speech perception or scholastic
achievement, but also the endorsement of spoken utterances.
Finally, the relative weight given to the epistemic cues involved
might also be explored by allowing them to conﬂict. Recently, a
study with adults has investigated this kind of conﬂict by con-
trasting ﬂuency and accuracy (Henkel and Mattson, 2011). The
study showed that the judgment of credibility generated by ﬂu-
ency (here, a repeated exposure to statements) is independent of
the reliability of the source. In children, the relationships between
different cues, and their relative weights, have also been tested.
For instance, Corriveau et al. (2013) have investigated how chil-
dren respectively weigh accent and accuracy. They showed that
endorsements of object labels depend on accuracy rather than
accent in 4- and 5-year-old children but not in 3-year-olds—who
performed at chance. Further research needs to be carried out on
the relations between ﬂuency and other cues, for instance when
ﬂuency conﬂicts with expertise or consensus.
Our results constitute a ﬁrst attempt to show that ﬂuency is
used as an epistemic cue for endorsing statements from age four
on. Given the demonstrated importance of ﬂuency for adults, it is
important to improve our understanding of the role of ﬂuency in
child development. Such research could, for instance, have impor-
tant pedagogical consequences: on the one hand, some types of
knowledge transmission and acquisition are facilitated via ﬂuency.
On the other hand, as mentioned above, some misleading impres-
sions of truth are also based on ﬂuency and any ways to increase
awareness ot these potentially misleading cues would be beneﬁcial,
for children and adults.
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